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Abstract 
 
 
This study looks into the factors that explain foreign direct investment in Brazil by 
country of origin of investment. Based on a sample of more than 100 countries that 
invested and have not yet invested in Brazil, multiple estimation techniques, such as the 
Tobit, Heckit and Probit, are used to isolate the effect of country risk on outward foreign 
direct investment. In sharp contrast to the findings of previous studies on the effect of 
home country risk on foreign investment in the United States, the findings in this paper 
reveal that less risky countries invest more in Brazil. These results are controlled for size 
of the home country, distance, trade intensity and previous investments abroad. A simple 
out of sample check shows that the model correctly predicts probability of investing for a 
large number of countries. The existing literature does not document these results. 
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1. Introduction 
There is some risk involved in every investment. If we are talking about 
investments across country borders, then additional types of risks have to be taken into 
consideration. These factors have long been recognized by the economics literature and 
some papers attempt to explain and estimate the relation between country risk and foreign 
investment. 
Country risk is the probability that a sovereign state may be unable to fulfill its 
commitments or, as argued by Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) may be unwilling to 
fulfill its commitments. The country risk analysis relies on the idea that economic, social 
or political unbalances affecting the country also affect the volatility of the investments’ 
rate of return. Meldrum (2000) decomposes the country risk into six categories: economic 
risk, transfer risk, exchange rate risk, location risk, sovereign risk and political risk. Hoti 
and McAleer (2004) survey the literature on country risk analysis.  
Nigh (1986) and Nigh and Schollammer (1987) analyze the effect of  political risk 
with an emphasis on conflict and cooperation relationships, concluding that cooperation 
between nation states stimulates investment across borders. Butler and Joaquin (1998) 
show that the higher the risk in the recipient country the higher the required rate of return 
for a multinational corporation to invest in that same country. Bevan and Estrin (2004) 
and Janicki and Wunnava (2004) show that country risk has a significant impact on 
foreign investment decisions. Le and Zak (2006) argue that political instability is one of 
the most important factors associated with capital flight.  
The cited studies conclude that risk is a determinant of foreign investment, but 
they focus on the characteristics of the host countries. They do not deal with the role of 
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the home country risk. Although the literature on this subtopic is not as rich, there are 
some exceptions. Brito and Sampayo (2005) develop a model that relates risk (both in the 
home and host countries) to the investment decisions. According to their model, higher 
risk (both at home and abroad) deters foreign investment. Unfortunately, probably due to 
data limitations, they tested the model without including a measure for home country risk. 
Their results confirmed previous studies: countries with higher risks had more difficulties 
in attracting foreign investment. 
We depart from this line of empirical inquiry and focus on the characteristics of 
the home countries. Our approach is similar to Tallman (1988) and Grosse and Trevino 
(1996), who advocate that domestic country risks influences outward foreign investment. 
To be more precise, these authors investigate the effect of political risk in the domestic 
country on the decision to invest in the United States. Tallman concludes that firms from 
countries with higher political risk have a higher propensity to invest in the United States. 
On the basis of somewhat weaker evidence, Grosse and Trevino also conclude that higher 
home country risk deters investments abroad.  
Emerging markets are now attracting considerable foreign investment. Over the 
last 20 years, we can observe an almost tenfold increase in foreign investment into 
emerging markets. Within the spectrum of emerging markets that have been attracting 
foreign investment, Brazil in one of the countries that stand out. In contrast to the United 
States, Brazil is a country with a high risk profile. We gather information for more than 
one hundred potential investor countries for the year of 2001. Of those countries, almost 
half of them do not invest in Brazil. We use the cross-section data for all countries 
(investors and non-investors) to analyze the factors that influence the decision to invest in 
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Brazil. The aim of the paper is not to suggest the optimal factors leading to foreign 
investment, as this would necessitate data across individual firms over a longer period of 
time. Rather, it seeks to assess the effect of domestic country risk on foreign investment. 
Testing the effect of home country factors in a single host country controls for host 
country effects that can obscure the home country factors of interest to the study.  
We use multiple methodologies to determine the home country factors that 
influence foreign investment in Brazil. Besides this we also estimate the probability of 
countries that have not invested in Brazil to do so and provide unique estimates of the 
size of such investment. An out-of sample analysis shows that our model can estimate 
with significant precision the probability of investment, which is surprisingly missing on 
the existing literature. Our findings show that the riskier the home country the lower the 
propensity to invest in Brazil. This is in sharp contrast to the results documented by 
Tallman (1988) and Grosse and Trevino (1996). Their prediction of the effect of risk on 
foreign investment can not be generalized.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
hypotheses, the choice of variables, and the econometric approach. In section 3, we 
describe some potential data drawbacks, and discuss which empirical issues should be 
handled carefully. In section 4, we present our econometric results. Section 5 draws out 
the conclusions. 
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2. Hypotheses, Data and Method 
2.1 Hypotheses and variables 
The object of this paper is to asses the influence of home country risk on foreign 
investment. This is our main hypotheses. The remaining hypotheses are used simply as 
controls. In doing so, we turn out depicting the characteristics of the country origin that 
influence foreign investment. 
According to Tallman (1988) and Grosse and Trevino (1996), firms operating in 
countries with higher internal political instability internationalize seeking to escape from 
home country risks. Both studies concluded that, ceteris paribus, investors from riskier 
countries are more likely to invest in the United States. But Brazil has different 
characteristics. Brazil is, by itself, a highly risky country and can hardly be considered a 
safe heaven. Contrary to the case of the United States, we may expect that firms wishing 
to invest in a country with a high risk profile need to have a solid and stable economic 
environment in the home country. Brito and Sampayo’s model also predicts that increases 
of risk in the home country lead to less investment abroad. Given these arguments, a 
priori, it is not clear if we should expect a positive or negative correlation between home 
country risk and its propensity to invest in Brazil. We use the country risk index of 
Euromoney. The country risk index is a sum of several specific risks (like political risk, 
economic performance, credit ratings, etc). They are all extremely correlated (with pair 
wise correlations above 90%), which makes the specific choice of risk measure almost 
irrelevant for our purposes. Using more than one would introduce obvious 
multicollinearity problems. Having to choose one, we chose the one with the lowest 
correlation with GDP per capita: credit ranking risk, which is based on the ratings of 
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Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and IBCA, and is generally considered to be a good 
measure of a healthy investment climate characterized by macroeconomic and political 
stability (e.g., see Janicki and Wunnava, 2004). According to this index, the lower the 
Country Risk, the higher is the index. 
 H.1: The relationship between home country risk and its propensity to invest 
is not clear. Therefore, we do not formulate a clear hypothesis. 
Firms originating in countries with wealthier countries are expected to invest 
more. The rationale is that firms from these countries are more apt to internationalize. We 
use GDP per capita as a proxy for the wealth of a country. To assemble the GDP per 
capita figures, we used the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) database. Alternatively, we also consider the Human Development Index 
(HDI), which is a broader measure of the wealth of a country and is less correlated with 
the Country Risk. HDI figures were obtained in the United Nations Reports for Human 
Development. 
H.2: The relationship between domestic wealth and foreign investment in 
Brazil should be positive.  
The cultural distance of the home country from Brazil may contribute to 
explaining the amount of FDI. The further away the home country the greater the cost of 
adapting to the local business conditions. To measure cultural distance we do not build an 
index but, instead, we use several dummy variables. We consider two proxies to measure 
cultural proximity: religion and language. Because Brazil is mostly catholic, we divided 
religion in three groups: Catholics, other Christians and other religions. The native 
language in Brazil is Portuguese. We divided the languages between Portuguese, Spanish, 
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Italian, French, English and others. The first four are the most spoken Latin languages, 
and English can be considered a universal language. Information for cultural variables 
was obtained in the CIA World Factbook. 
H.3: The relationship between cultural distance and foreign investment in 
Brazil should be negative. 
The geographical distance between the home country and Brazil can also 
influence the decision to invest due to the higher cost of monitoring foreign affiliates. To 
measure the distance between Brazil and another country, we consider the distance in 
kilometers between countries’ capitals. We used a software developed by Byers (1999) to 
estimate these distances. 
H.4: The relationship between geographical distance and foreign investment 
in Brazil should be negative. 
International trade and foreign investment are often viewed as complementary. 
Following the results of previous studies, we can expect higher exports to Brazil to be 
linked to higher levels of foreign investment. To measure bilateral trade we include the 
value of exports from each country to Brazil.1 The Ministry for Development, Industry 
and International Trade of Brazil (Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio 
Exterior) made the data available. 
H.5: The larger the amount of exports to Brazil, the larger the foreign 
investment in Brazil. 
                                                 
1 Including imports does not change the results, but we would loose some observations. 
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The larger the economic size of a country the greater the number of home firms 
that can invest abroad. Naturally, we expect the relation between the size of domestic 
market the foreign investment into Brazil to be positive. We include two variables that 
serve as proxies to the economic size of a country: gross domestic product (GDP) and 
total accumulated direct investment abroad (DIA). GDP is a good measure of the 
domestic economic dimension of the home country. With DIA, we expect to measure the 
international presence of each country. We used the UNCTAD database to collect data on 
GDP and DIA. 
H.6: The larger the economic output of the domestic country, the larger the 
foreign investment into Brazil. 
The data are cross-section observations of the foreign countries variables 
described above and cross-section observations of foreign direct investment in Brazil. 
Our database includes observations for 113 countries (in the appendix we list the 
countries). All data refer to the year 2001. The dependent variable, foreign investment in 
Brazil by country of origin, was made available by the Central Bank of Brazil. The 
explanatory variables that we considered were described in earlier. 
2.2 Method 
Almost one-half of the countries included in our database have not invested in 
Brazil. This means that, in our analysis, we include potential foreign investors in Brazil, 
instead of considering only countries with positive investments. This distinguishes our 
study from previous studies and it is the main advantage of performing cross-section 
regressions: it is easier to collect information for a large number of countries. The 
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presence of countries with zero foreign investment in Brazil renders the typical OLS 
estimates to be inadequate. If we eliminate the countries with zero investment, the OLS 
estimates will be inconsistent (e.g. see Greene, 2003).  
We can think of the investment decision as a two steps decision. First, firms have 
to decide whether to enter in Brazil or not. Then, if they decide to enter, they have to 
choose how much to invest. We consider two different models. The Tobit model (Tobin 
1958) and the Heckit model (Heckman 1979).  
The Tobit model can be described as follows: 
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where yi* is the latent dependent variable, yi is the observed dependent variable, xi is the 
vector of the independent variables, β  is the vector of coefficients, and the ui’s are 
assumed to be independently normally distributed.  
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where zi* is the latent dependent variable. If positive there is investment (z = 1), if 
negative there is no investment (z = 0), wi is the vector of the independent variables that 
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influence the decision of whether to invest in Brazil, γ is the vector of coefficients, and 
the ei’s are assumed to be independently normally distributed. If z = 1, then the last 
equation determines how much is invested. 
Whereas the Tobit model was designed to deal with estimation bias associated 
with censoring, the Heckit model is a response to sample selection bias. The two models 
have different motivations. The rationale behind equation 1 is that firms choose how 
much to invest in Brazil (y*), but choices below zero are censored, because it is not 
possible to invest less than nothing. Therefore, we do not observe 0.y <  Behind equation 
2, the idea is that firms first decide if they want to invest in Brazil ( )1=z  or not ( )0=z . 
Then, only if they chose to invest, they have to choose how much (y). We estimate both 
the Tobit and the Heckit models by Maximum Likelihood.  
3. Results 
3.1 Exploratory Analysis 
Some preliminary results led us to eliminate some of the independent variables. 
Cultural distance, as measured by religion, was statistically insignificant. In appendix 2, 
we list some descriptive statistics of the variables included in table 1. The mother 
language dummies were also irrelevant, except for Portuguese and Spanish, which is a 
natural result since Portuguese is the official language of Brazil and Spanish is so similar.  
 
[ Insert table 1 here] 
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In table 1, we can see the matrix of correlations between several independent 
variables. Looking at the table we observe that multicollinearity may be a potential 
problem. Country Risk is highly correlated with GDP per capita. This is particularly 
relevant because we want to assess the explanatory power of Country Risk and we want 
to be sure that effects of other variables do not contaminate the estimated coefficients. 
We consider three different approaches to ensure that multicollinearity is not a 
problem in our estimations. First, we perform the Condition Index test proposed by 
Belsley (1991). Second, we calculate the variance inflation factors associated with each 
independent variable. Third, to measure wealth, we replace GDP per capita by HDI, 
which is less correlated with Country Risk. All these approaches point towards the same 
direction. Multicollinearity is not a problem and it is unlikely that our results are being 
contaminated by its presence. 
3.2 Main Results 
Table 2 presents the main results. There are four groups of estimated models. For 
each group, we report the Tobit and Heckit estimation results in different columns. The 
estimations are remarkably similar. The Heckit includes the estimation of a Probit 
auxiliary selection model. We report the Probit estimation results associated with the 
fourth Heckit estimation in a separate column.2  
 
[ Insert table 2 here] 
 
                                                 
2 We do not include the Probit estimations for each Heckit model because there are no significant 
differences. 
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The results for Model 1 and 2 reveal that GDP per capita’s estimated coefficient 
appears with a negative sign and it is not statistically significant, while Country Risk’s 
estimated coefficient is positive and statistically very significant. Variables measuring 
cultural distance have the expected signs: speak Portuguese or Spanish have higher 
propensity to invest in Brazil. The geographic distance appears with the expected sign, 
but the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 10% level only if we consider a 
one tail test. This may happen because the neighboring countries of Brazil speak Spanish, 
and hence it is possible that the Spanish language dummy is capturing part of its effect. 
Generally speaking, we confirm the results of previous studies. The proximity, 
both culturally and geographically, of the countries enhances the interest in foreign direct 
investment decisions. Contrary to expected, the bilateral trade estimated coefficient is 
statistically not significant. This variable was removed in model 2. Variables that 
measure both country domestic and international dimension are relevant. As expected, the 
higher the GDP and total Direct Investment Abroad, the higher is the propensity to invest 
in Brazil. These results are supported by several other studies.  
In Table 2, model 4 reports the estimated results, when only variables with 
statistically significant coefficients are included. As one can observe there are no 
significant differences in the results. The variables included in the Probit were all the 
variables present in model 1. As we can see, the estimated coefficients are in line with the 
other estimation results. 
Our results differ from previous similar studies (e.g. Tallman, 1988, and Grosse 
and Trevino, 1996) on two regards: GDP per capita has no explanatory power and the 
effect of Country Risk is the opposite. Before drawing definite conclusions about these 
 13
estimates, we first rule out the possibility of linear dependence between the independent 
variables. Note, however, that the main consequences of these are generally the large 
standard errors leading to lower z-statistics, which can lead to incorrect non-rejections of 
the null hypothesis. Therefore, the relevance of the Country Risk is not in question. The 
biggest hazard is to incorrectly conclude that GDP per capita is irrelevant.  
3.3 Multicollinearity Robustness Check 
If there is perfect multicollinearity, at least one of the eigenvalues of the matrix 
XTX will be zero. If it is not perfect, small eigenvalues indicate strong multicollinearity. 
To assess the severity of multicollinearity problems,) we used the condition index test 
(Belsley, 1991), which involves the following steps: (1) standardization of the 
explanatory variables to unit variance; (2) computation of the eigenvalues of the 
standardized XTX; (3) the condition index is given by minmax λλ , where ( )minmax λλ  is 
the highest (lowest) eigenvalue. As a rule of thumb, it is usually considered that if the 
index is above 30, then there is definitely linear dependence between the variables. 
Greene (2003) suggests that values above 20 may indicate such dependence. Computing 
the condition index of our models 1 and 2, we find a value of 8.354 and 8.275 
respectively. These values are way below the suggested lower bounds, indicating that 
linear dependence is not a serious problem. 
Another typical procedure to check if multicollinearity is a problem is to regress 
each independent variable against all the others and then use the R2 of this auxiliary 
regression to compute the variance inflation factor (VIF). As a rule of thumb it is 
common to consider that multicollinearity is a problem if VIF > 10. For each independent 
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variable of model 2, we computed its VIF. The highest value we got was 4.25. Again, the 
evidence suggests that the results are not poisoned by multicollinearity. 
As we can see in table 1, the correlation between Country Risk and HDI, although 
still high, is lower than the correlation between Country Risk and GDP per capita. If we 
substitute HDI for GDP per capita, the results do not change substantially. In table 2, the 
results for the Tobit and Heckit estimations of model 3 shows that the coefficient 
associated to HDI is statistically not significant. Country Risk is still significant at 1% 
level. 
One of the main consequences of multicollinearity is the high sensibility of the 
estimators to small changes in the sample size, or the chosen variables. We omit the 
results of several of the experiments that we undertook, such as removing variables or 
trying to increase the sample size. In all the regressions, the message was the same. 
Country Risk is perennially relevant while the estimated coefficients for GDP per capita 
are statistically not significant. The fact that the Tobit and Heckit estimates are so similar 
is also evidence on the same direction. 
4. Simple Out-of-Sample Check 
The models were estimated using data for 2001. Looking at countries that did not 
invest in Brazil in 2001, we can expect that the ones with higher probability of investing 
will decide to invest in subsequent years. To check if this is true, we gathered data on 
foreign investment in Brazil for 2005. In the appendix we report the values for foreign 
investment in Brazil for 2001 and 2005. We also included, for each country, the estimated 
investment according to the Tobit and Heckit models. For the Tobit model we used the 
expected value of the latent variable. For both Tobit and Heckit we replaced negative 
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values by zero. We also report the probabilities of investing given by the estimated 
Selection Probit model.  
The 49 countries that in 2001 did not invest in Brazil had an average estimated 
probability of investing of 16%. But the 11 countries that did not invest in Brazil but 
decided to do so in 2005 had an average estimated probability of 28%. If we restrict our 
attention to the 64 countries that did invest in Brazil in 2001, we see that the average of 
the estimated probability is 57%. Of these countries, six of them did not invest in 2005. 
For these, the average of the estimated probability is 21%. Again, the facts do conform to 
the predictions of the model. Notably, the model’s performance is very poor in the case 
Liberia that invested in Brazil in both years, but whose estimated probability is about 7%. 
El Salvador and Iceland did not invest in Brazil in both years, but the estimated 
probabilities are 67% and 57%. 
5. Conclusions 
Tallman (1988) and Grosse and Trevino (1996) studied the effect of home country 
risk on foreign investment in the United States. Their work was original because they 
focused on the characteristics of the home country. Among other conclusions, both 
studies documented that, ceteris paribus, investors from riskier countries are more likely 
to invest in the United States. 
In this paper, we have studied the effect of home country risk on foreign 
investment in Brazil. Like Tallman (1988), our main concern was with the importance of 
Country Risk. There are some important differences between our papers. First, unlike the 
United States, Brazil is a risky country. Second, because we consider cross-section data, 
we are not able to capture any dynamic effects. Instead, we are able to consider a much 
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larger set of countries, including countries that have never invested in Brazil. Standard 
results from previous studies (like the importance of distance or the country dimension) 
are basically replicated. The more important result is the effect of Country Risk. Our 
results are in sharp contrast to the ones reported by Tallman (1988) and Grosse and 
Trevino (1996). Investors from safer countries are more enthusiastic about investing in 
Brazil. Interestingly, and contradicting previous studies, the wealth effect seems 
irrelevant on the decision of whether and how much to invest in Brazil. Probably this 
happens because the relevant dimension of wealth is already captured by the Country 
Risk index, which also captures other socio-economic features of the home country, like 
political and financial stability, friendly investment environment, etc. 
We do not follow the same econometric approach of Tallman (1988) and Grosse 
and Trevino (1996), but there is no reason to believe that the difference in results are due 
to that idiosyncrasy; especially because the results are so highly significant and because 
the Tobit and Heckit (and the associated Probit) estimations delivered, essentially, the 
same results. Further the out of sample analysis attests the predictive ability of the model. 
It is certainly reasonable to think that this result is explained by the risk profile 
differences between the United States and Brazil. Whether firms from safe heavens invest 
in Brazil to diversify their portfolio or to exploit growth opportunities that an emerging 
market like Brazil has to offer are interesting avenues for future research.  
 17
References 
Belsley, D. (1991), Conditioning Diagnostics-Collinearity and Weak Data in 
Regression, Wiley Series in Probability and Mathematical Satistics, John Wiley & Sons. 
Bevan, A. and Estrin, S. (2004) ‘The determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
in Transition Economies’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 32: 775-787. 
Brito, J., and Sampayo, F. (2005) ‘The timing and probability of FDI: an 
application to US multinational enterprises’, Applied Economics, 37: 417-437. 
Byers, J. (2003) ‘Great Circle Distances’, http://chemical-ecology.net/.  
CIA (2006), The World Factbook 2006, Central Intelligence Agency.  
Eaton, J., Gersovitz, M. and Stiglitz, J. (1986) ‘The pure theory of country risk’, 
European Economic Review, 30: 481-513. 
Euromoney (2001), ‘Cautious Optimism on World Economy’, Issue 383. 
Greene, W. (2003) Econometric Analysis, 5ª Edition, Prentice Hall. 
Grosse, R. and Trevino, L. (1996) ‘Foreign direct investment in the United States: 
An analysis by country of origin’, Journal of International Business Studies, 27(1): 139-
155. 
Heckman, J. (1979) ‘Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error’, 
Econometrica, 47(1): 153-161. 
Hoti, S. and McAleer, M. (2004) ‘An empirical assessment of country risk ratings 
and associated models’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 18: 539-588. 
 18
Janicki, H. and Wunnava, P. (2004) ‘Determinants of foreign direct investment: 
empirical evidence from EU accession candidates’, Applied Economics, 36: 505-509. 
Le, Q. V. and Zak P. (2006), ‘Political risk and capital flight’, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 25: 308-329. 
Meldrum, D. (2000) ‘Country risk and foreign direct investment’, Business. 
Economics, 35:33-40. 
Nigh, D. (1986) ‘Political Events and the Foreign Direct Investment Decision: an 
Empirical Examination’, Managerial and Decision Economics, 7: 99-106. 
Nigh, D. E Schollhammer, H. (1987) ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Political 
Conflict and Co-operation: The Asymmetric Response Hypothesis’, Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 8: 307-312. 
Tallman, S. (1988) ‘Home Country Political Risk and Foreign Direct Investment 
in the United States’, Journal of International Business Studies, 19(2): 219-233. 
Tobin, J. (1958) ‘Estimation for relationships with limited dependent variables’, 
Econometrica, 26 (1), 24-36. 
 19
 
 
  Table 1 ─ Independent variables correlation matrix 
  
Country 
Risk GDP pc HDI Portuguese Spanish Distance 
Exports to 
Brazil GDP DIA 
Country 
Risk 1 0.82 0.76 -0.11 -0.07 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.44 
GDP pc 0.82 1 0.67 -0.10 -0.18 0.12 0.19 0.40 0.52 
HDI 0.76 0.67 1 -0.21 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.32 
Portuguese -0.11 -0.10 -0.21 1 -0.08 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
Spanish -0.07 -0.18 0.04 -0.08 1 -0.52 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 
Distance 0.16 0.12 0.04 -0.13 -0.52 1 0.04 0.05 0.02 
Exports to 
Brazil 0.19 0.19 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 1 0.22 0.19 
GDP 0.31 0.40 0.22 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.22 1 0.85 
DIA 0.44 0.52 0.32 -0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.19 0.85 1 
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Table 2 ─ Regression results on FDI in Brazil 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Tobit Heckit Tobit Heckit Tobit Heckit Tobit Heckit 
Probit 
selection 
Constant -486 (-2.95) 
-486 
(-3.03) 
-486 
(-2.95) 
-486 
(-3.00) 
-589 
(-1.28) 
-588 
(-1.28) 
-495 
(-3.03) 
-495 
(-3.10) 
-1.236 
(-3.11) 
          
Country Risk 9.42 (4.12) 
9.42 
(4.19) 
9.43 
(4.15) 
9.43 
(4.05) 
9.11 
(3.43) 
9.10 
(3.41) 
8.81 
(5.39) 
8.81 
(5.50) 
0.022 
(5.26) 
          
GDP per 
capita 
-2.46E-03  
(-0.39) 
-2.44E-03 
(-0.40) 
-2.46E-03 
(-0.40) 
-2.43E-03 
(-0.39)     
-3.01E-08 
(-0.02) 
          
HDI     
-22.7 
(-0.04) 
-22.3 
(-0.04)    
          
Portuguese 673 (2.86) 
673 
(2.86) 
673 
(2.86) 
673 
(2.86) 
732 
(2.89) 
733 
(2.89) 
681 
(2.91) 
681 
(2.90) 
1.699 
(2.85) 
          
Spanish 363 (2.44) 
363 
(2.45) 
362 
(2.44) 
363 
(2.44) 
448 
(2.96) 
448 
(2.95) 
378 
(2.63) 
378 
(2.64) 
0.943 
(2.65) 
          
Distance -0.021 (-1.50) 
-0.021 
(-1.50) 
-0.026 
(-1.52) 
-0.021 
(-1.5) 
-0.013 
(-0.87) 
-0.013 
(-0.85) 
--0.020 
(-1.46) 
-0.020 
(-1.45) 
-4.96E-05 
(-1.44) 
          
Exports to 
Brazil 
1.15E-04 
(0.02) 
1.15E-04 
 (0.02)       
6.79E-09 
(0.79) 
          
GDP 2.63E-04 (3.71) 
2.63E-04 
(3.70) 
2.63E-04 
(3.75) 
2.63E-04 
(3.74) 
2.58E-04 
(3.64) 
2.58E-04 
(3.64) 
2.61E-04 
(3.73) 
2.61E-04 
(3.72) 
6.49E-07 
(3.55) 
          
DIA 9.61E-04 (2.22) 
9.61E-04 
(2.21) 
9.59E-04 
(2.22) 
9.61E-04 
(-0.486) 
9.93E-04 
(2.27) 
9.96E-04 
(2.27) 
9.51E-04 
(2.20) 
9.53E-04 
(2.21) 
2.40E-06 
(2.18) 
z-statistics in parenthesis         
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Appendix 1 (a) 
 Country 
 
2001 Values 2005 Values 
TOBIT 
estimated 
values 
Heckit 
estimated 
values 
PROBIT 
United States 4,464.9 4,644.2 4,271.2 4,271.7 1.00 
Spain 2,766.6 1,220.4 916.5 916.8 0.99 
France 1,912.8 1,458.4 1,045.9 1,046.0 0.99 
Netherlands 1,891.8 3,207.9 620.4 620.6 0.93 
Portugal 1,692.3 334.6 915.7 916.8 0.99 
Germany 1,047.5 1,269.3 1,267.3 1,267.2 1.00 
Japan 826.6 779.1 1,334.4 1,333.8 1.00 
Bermuda 606.9 38.9 174.1 175.3 0.67 
Canada 441.1 1,435.3 606.6 607.3 0.93 
United Kingdom 416.2 153.3 1,412.4 1,411.9 1.00 
Luxembourg 284.7 139.1 224.9 225.7 0.71 
Italy 281.3 345.7 556.6 557.0 0.91 
Bahamas 264.2 87.8 0.0 0.0 0.45 
Switzerland 181.8 341.5 515.0 515.4 0.89 
Uruguay 180.6 169.2 263.8 264.4 0.75 
Panama 133.0 165.6 188.2 188.4 0.68 
Belgium 113.1 685.6 351.8 352.2 0.80 
Norway 83.1 43.2 283.1 283.7 0.76 
Austria 67.0 6.1 272.9 273.6 0.75 
Chile 62.0 102.7 457.0 457.9 0.87 
Mexico 61.1 1,661.2 324.4 324.2 0.79 
Argentina 56.8 112.2 183.7 183.9 0.68 
Sweden 54.3 32.9 302.0 302.3 0.77 
Denmark 33.2 239.9 288.9 289.4 0.76 
Hong Kong 33.0 17.4 150.4 148.4 0.62 
China 28.1 7.6 59.9 58.7 0.56 
Korea South 25.0 168.0 0.0 0.0 0.33 
Singapore 15.9 42.3 111.9 111.1 0.60 
Finland 12.7 6.6 237.0 237.4 0.72 
Taiwan 12.3 3.7 49.0 47.9 0.54 
Australia 10.7 926.0 217.3 217.0 0.70 
Morocco 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.28 
Ireland 9.0 125.1 260.1 260.8 0.74 
South Africa 5.7 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.34 
Philippines 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.12 
Barbados 4.8 6.8 13.3 14.4 0.51 
Israel 4.6 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.46 
India 3.4 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.23 
Venezuela 3.2 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.49 
Ecuador 2.3 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.35 
Colombia 1.3 1.6 201.2 201.4 0.69 
Paraguay 1.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.47 
Mauritius 0.7 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.25 
Cyprus 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.47 
Greece 0.6 1.6 12.6 12.9 0.51 
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Appendix 1 (b)      
 Country 
 
2001 Values 2005 Values 
TOBIT 
estimated 
values 
Heckit 
estimated 
values 
PROBIT 
Angola 0.5 0.4 56.6 55.9 0.56 
Slovenia 0.5 0.0 5.0 5.3 0.51 
Czech Republic 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.40 
Qatar 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.26 
Libya 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 
Guatemala 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.47 
Guyana 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.09 
Malaysia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.24 
Turkey 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.11 
Malta 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.46 
Liberia 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.07 
Costa Rica 0.1 0.8 101.7 101.6 0.60 
Dominican Republic 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.47 
Peru 0.0 1.0 91.6 91.7 0.59 
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.23 
United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.1 57.1 57.2 0.56 
New Zealand 0.0 48.1 107.1 107.2 0.61 
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.42 
Zimbabwe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.24 
Armenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.03 
Bahrain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.24 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.02 
Belarus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Belize 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.22 
Bolivia 0.0 2.1 62.0 62.2 0.56 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.09 
Burkina Faso 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.06 
Cape Verde 0.0 0.2 100.2 99.9 0.60 
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.02 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 
Croatia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.25 
El Salvador 0.0 0.0 178.6 178.6 0.67 
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.23 
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.32 
Ethiopia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 
Haiti 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 
Iran 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 
Iceland 0.0 0.0 77.1 77.6 0.58 
Jamaica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.15 
Kenya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 
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Appendix 1 (c)      
 Country 
 
2001 Values 2005 Values 
TOBIT 
estimated 
values 
Heckit 
estimated 
values 
PROBIT 
Laos 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.02 
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.22 
Lebanon 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.09 
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.22 
Macedonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Madagascar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Mozambique 0.0 0.0 22.7 21.7 0.52 
Oman 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.23 
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 
Papua New Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.06 
Poland 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.41 
Romania 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.08 
Russia 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.10 
Rwanda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 
Saint Lucia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.08 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadin 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.08 
Seychelles 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.04 
Sri Lanka 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.03 
Swaziland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 
Tunísia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.31 
Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 
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Appendix 2 
 
  
FDI in Brazil Country Risk GDP pc HDI Portuguese 
 Mean 160 43.51 8995 0.76 0.035 
 Median 0.075 43.80 3866 0.78 0 
 Maximum 4465 100 56046 0.94 1 
 Minimum 0.00 0 91.5 0.33 0 
 Std. Dev. 579.87 36.7 11189 0.16 0.19 
 
Observations 113 113 113 110 113 
            
 Unit 10
6 US 
Dollars index 
103 US 
Dollars index Binary 
 Source Central Bank of Brazil Euromoney
United 
Nations 
Conference 
on Trade and 
Development 
United 
Nations 
CIA - The 
World 
Factbook  
      
  
Spanish Distance Exports to Brazil GDP 
Direct 
Investment 
Abroad 
 Mean 0.142 9316 994 265818 56587 
 Median 0 9401 75 19969 729 
 Maximum 1 18803 58223 10075900 1460352 
 Minimum 0 1 0 346 0.00012 
 Std. Dev. 0.35 4055 5631 1050227 183519 
 
Observations 113 113 113 113 113 
            
 Unit Binary Kilometers 10
6 US 
Dollars 
106 US 
Dollars 
10^6 US 
Dollars 
 Source 
CIA - The 
World 
Factbook  
Byers 
(2003) 
Ministry for 
Development, 
Industry and 
International 
Trade of 
Brazil 
United 
Nations 
Conference 
on Trade and 
Development 
United 
Nations 
Conference 
on Trade and 
Development 
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